See exerpt from Feb 8:
"Tacit Collusion- In the past, Dow and Monsanto have worked to strategically cooperate on development of GM corn seeds. While care was taken to avoid explicit collusion (which is illegal), they also had to attempt to avoid tacit collusion as well, which is sometimes difficult in horizontal alliances." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_collusion)
To better understand what tacit collusion is (as the lines seem blurry), let's start with wikipedia that defines it like this:
While competition in any industry is good for the consumer, it pushes product and service quality, helps keep prices down, and gives the consumer choices, it is reasonable to see how businesses could benefit from not competing if possible. This would only be possible if (1) the company had a monopoly on the market or (2) the companies at odds agreed to share amicably serving the best interests of both.
When the latter is the condition, things can get sticky. A price leader is defined by Barney in the text as "a firm that sets acceptable industry prices or margins." This characteristic sets the stage many times for collusion. In an industry where costs for research and development are significant and the time for a product to make it to market is lengthy, there would seem to be much temptation for collusion. If Monsanto knows that company B Iin the above case, Dow) is working on a specific line of corn seeds, it would be in the best interest of both companies not to invest years and millions of dollars into an identical product. Thus they cooperate.
Also, there is much to consider when setting the prices to ensure the costs of R&D are recouped, especially in the agriculture industry where depending on the season/weather/pests and various factors, needs may change and the window of opportunity for sales might be difficult to predict.
That being considered, as long as the competition knows what is in the pipeline for their adversaries, tacit collusion is a non-issue due to the costly-to-duplicate nature of the GM industry.